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ABSTRACT
Company directors are subject to certain fiduciary duties discussed under common law and 
in statutory provisions. Directors’ fiduciary duties include duty to protect the confidentiality 
of company information. Any information that belongs to the company is to be used only 
by the company for the company. Such information is considered the property of the 
company and it must be used to the advantage of the company. The objective of this paper 
is to discuss the duty of nominee directors concerning the confidentiality of company 
information. Nominee directors who actually represent their nominators on a board of 
directors will find their duty challenging as they might be expected by their nominators 
to provide them with certain company information. The study is based on doctrinal and 
statutory analysis of selected jurisdiction as well as cases based on various jurisdiction. It is 
argued that nominee directors are in a vulnerable position as directors who are representing 
their nominators at the same time. Though it has been clearly legislated that their loyalty 
is to the company they should to a certain extent be allowed to disclose information that 
would not jeopardise their companies. 
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INTRODUCTION
Directors, as responsible persons who 
manage their company, are subject to 
certain fiduciary duties provided by the 
Companies Act as well as Common law. 
One of directors’ fiduciary duties is the duty 
of avoiding conflict of interests. Under this 
broad duty, directors are responsible for 
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protecting the confidentiality of company 
information. This article discusses the 
exercise of this duty by nominee directors. 
Despite the fact that nominee directors 
are appointed as directors to represent the 
interest of their nominators, they are subject 
to the same duties as other types of director 
i.e. to act in the best interest of the company/
shareholders as a whole (Greenhalgh v 
Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch 286).
Nominee directors definitely are 
duty-bound to protect the interests of the 
company; however, at the same time they 
are expected to safeguard the interests 
of their nominators. They are constantly 
confronted by the dilemma of whether 
they should disclose information of interest 
to their nominators if their nominators 
were to request such information. Their 
nominators, of course, would believe 
that they are entitled to such information. 
As directors who manage the company 
they have easy access to all company 
information, including highly confidential 
information. The statutory provisions 
provide that company directors are entitled 
to certain company information such as the 
records of the company. Thus, the duty of 
protecting the confidentiality of company 
information is crucial for nominee directors, 
given their dual position.
Nominee Directors
In todays’ corporate world the existence 
of nominee director/s on a company’s 
board of directors is inevitable. Nominee 
directors are those who are nominated 
to the board by an individual or class of 
shareholders or by certain groups such 
as major creditors or employees of the 
company (Companies and Securities Law 
Review Committee, 1987). It is common 
practice for major shareholders, holding 
companies, institutional shareholders 
and joint ventures to have a director as 
their representative on the board. Lord 
Denning M. R. referred to a nominee 
director as a director who is nominated by 
a large shareholder to represent his interests 
(Boulting v Association of Cinematograph, 
Television and Allied Technicians [1963] 
2 QB 606, pp. 626-7). Since they are 
representing an individual or a group of 
persons, they can be described as a trustee of 
their nominators (Re Syed Ahmad Alsagoff 
(1960) 1 MLJ 147) or as a watchdog of their 
nominators, appointed to ensure that the 
nominators’ rights are properly safeguarded. 
Duty of Nominee Directors
Nominee directors do not act in their own 
capacity; thus, they may in a way think 
that they owe a certain extent of loyalty 
to their nominators, who were responsible 
for putting them in their present position. 
However, the chief duty of a director is to act 
in the best interests of the company. Winslow 
J. in his dicta said, “A company is entitled 
to the undivided loyalty of its director. A 
director who is the nominee of someone 
else should be left free to exercise his best 
judgement in the interest of the company he 
serves and not in accordance of his patron” 
(Raffles Hotel Ltd v Rayner [1965] 1 MLJ 
60). Lord Denning mentioned that it would 
be unlawful for nominee directors to act in 
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the affairs of their company in accordance 
with the directions of his nominators 
(Boulting’s at 626).
Section 132(1E) of the Malaysian 
Companies Act 1965 provides that the 
nominee director shall act in the best 
interest of the company and in the event of 
any conflict between his duty to act in the 
best interest of the company and his duty 
to his nominator, he shall not subordinate 
his duty to act in the best interest of the 
company to his duty to his nominator. 
This provision explains the general duty 
of nominee directors, that their loyalty and 
allegiance are to the company and not to 
their nominators. 
The Court of Appeal in Re Neath Rugby 
Ltd ([2009] EWCA Civ 291) in referring 
to nominee directors held that the fact a 
director of a company has been nominated 
to that office does not impose any duty owed 
to his nominator unless provided otherwise 
by any formal or informal agreement that he 
has with his nominators. The court conceded 
that it is normal for nominee directors to act 
according to the wishes of their nominators 
who had put them in that position provided 
they would not be in breach of their duties 
to act in the best interest of the company.
Street J (at p.310) in Bennetts v Board 
of Fire Commissioners of New South 
Wales ((1967) 87 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 307) 
said that the nominee director should 
not use his position as an opportunity to 
serve the group that nominated him. The 
nominee director should not allow himself 
to be a mere channel of communication or 
listening post for his nominators. In this 
case, Bennets had been elected to the Board 
of Fire Commissioners by the Firemen’s 
Union. Later, the Union was involved in 
an industrial dispute with the Board. The 
Chairman of the Board obtained legal advice 
that he would not disclose to Bennetts 
unless Bennetts gave an undertaking take he 
would not disclose it to the Union. Bennetts 
disagreed and commenced a proceeding 
for a declaration that he was entitled to the 
information.
The decision in Bennetts was followed 
in Harkness v Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia Ltd ((1993)32 NSWR 543 at 555), 
where the court held on the same point 
that “… whether a person is elected by a 
special interest group, considered to be a 
representative of one group for another 
group, or a nominee director, does not 
alter the fact that the person owes the duty 
of confidence to the board to which he or 
she has been appointed.” This has been 
described as a strict rule imposed upon 
nominee directors. It would be unrealistic 
to prescribe such a blanket prohibition on 
all nominee directors because nominee 
directors are actually the representatives of 
their nominators and it would be impractical 
not to expect them to have any regards 
at all to the interests of their nominators 
(Crutchfield, 1992). Jacobs J (at p.1663) in 
Re Broadcasting Station 2GB Ltd ([1964-
65] NSWR 1648) viewed that such a rule 
would make the position of a nominee 
director impossible. Jacobs J. observed that 
nominee directors should be allowed to 
consider the nominators’ interests provided 
that it would be in the best interests of the 
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company as well (Levin v Clark [1962] 
NSWR 686).
It is worth noting that in a recent case, 
Central Bank of Ecuador and others v 
Conticorp SA and others ([2015] UKPC 
11), the Privy Council agreed with the lower 
court decision that a director must act bona 
fide in the best interests of the company; 
he must positively apply his mind to the 
question of what the company’s interests 
are; he must exercise independent judgement 
and not fetter his discretion; and the same is 
expected from the nominee director (citing 
Lord Denning’s in Boulting’s). The court, 
therefore, in this case asserted that Mr Taylor 
as sole director and nominee investment 
adviser of IAMF (the second Appellant) had 
breached his fiduciary duty by acting on the 
instructions of the Respondents. Mr. Taylor 
had a duty to understand IAMF’s affairs 
and to apply his own mind to act in the best 
interests of IAMF.
Duty to protect confidentiality of 
information.  One of the important duties 
of a director is to avoid conflict of interest. 
Under this duty, directors must not put 
themselves in a position of conflict where 
he has direct or indirect interest. This duty 
refers to the exploitation of any property, 
information or opportunity irrespective of 
whether the company could gain benefit 
out of it or not. Section 132(2)(b) of the 
Malaysian Companies Act 1965 states 
that a director is not allowed to use any 
information that he acquired in his position 
as a director of a company for his own 
benefit or for the benefit of any other 
person or cause detrimental to the company. 
Though the provision does not elaborate on 
the meaning of ‘information’, the meaning 
may include trade secrets, list of customers 
and other information that could be deemed 
confidential (Abd & Samsar, 2007). In 
Electro Cad University Australia Pty Ltd 
v Mejati RCS Sdn. Bhd & Ors ([1998] 
3 MLJ 422), the defendant (director), 
without the company’s knowledge, had used 
information about the company’s product. 
The information here refers to technical and 
marketing data. Subsequently, the defendant 
manufactured an identical product in direct 
competition with the plaintiff’s product. 
The High Court issued an injunction to 
restrain further breach and divulging of 
any confidential information. The court had 
also declared that the plaintiff was the true 
owner of the confidential information and 
trade secrets. The court further ordered the 
defendant to relinquish any documents or 
materials related to the products and to pay 
damages to the plaintiff. The court agreed 
that the first and second defendants owed an 
equitable obligation to the second plaintiff 
in relation of the confidential information 
they received in their capacity as consultant 
and director, respectively. The confidential 
information had been used by the defendants 
in designing, manufacturing, marketing and 
promoting their product ‘Stopcar’, which 
was in competition with the product belong 
to the plaintiffs, ‘Stopcard’.
In defining what is confidential, 
Kalamanathan J (at p. 441) perceived 
that confidential information refers to 
information that is the object of an obligation 
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of confidence and is used to cover all 
information of confidential character, for 
example, trade secrets. The judge further 
explained that it is not necessary for the 
confidential information to be patentable; 
it was simply necessary to show that the 
information was confidential and could not 
be found in the public domain. 
Goulding J (at pp117-8) stated that 
information that was gained while in the 
course of employment was characterised by 
three identifiers: first, it is information that 
is easily accessible to the public and thus, 
an employee would be at liberty to impart it 
during or after his employment; second, it is 
confidential information that cannot be used 
or disclosed during the nominee director’s 
employment but in the absence of an express 
restriction, the nominee director is free to use 
the information, once his employment has 
ended; and third, it is information regarding 
specific trade secrets that a nominee director 
should not use or disclose either during or 
after his employment (Faccenda Chicken 
Ltd v Fowler [1987] 1 Ch. 117).
According to Young J. in Harkness 
v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd 
([1993]32 NSWR 543 at 553),
What is confidential is not to be 
found merely by looking to see 
whether someone has marked 
‘confidential’ against an item. 
The obligation of directors is to 
keep secret any matter which is 
discussed, the communication of 
which might detrimentally affect 
the company, indeed, even the 
issuing of information as to who 
voted in what way on a particular 
resolution may detrimentally affect 
the working of a company if it is 
breezed abroad.
Confidential information has been further 
specified in Canterbury-Hurlstone Park RSL 
Club Ltd v Roberts ([2008] NSWSC 845), 
where the court considered the discussion 
at Board meetings concerning the sale of 
particular assets, a review on the performance 
of the Chief Executive Officer and views of 
the Board members to be confidential as 
they were not known to the public. Thus, 
confidential information can be construed 
as material corporate information, and the 
disclosure of such information would be 
detrimental to the company. As emphasised 
by the Corporate Director’s Guidebook 
(2007), the disclosure of non-public 
information by directors would damage 
the trust among directors and management 
and jeopardise boardroom effectiveness 
and directors’ collaboration. It is deduced 
that whether a piece of information is 
confidential or not would depend on whether 
it is available to the public or not as well as 
whether its disclosure would be detrimental 
to the company or not.
Nominee Directors and Confidential 
Company Information
To avoid conflict of interest a director 
is bound by the duty of protecting the 
confidentiality of company information. 
With regards to nominee directors, their 
loyalty or priority is to the company; they 
cannot disclose confidential company 
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information to anybody, even their 
nominators (who might be the majority 
shareholders) who have put them in their 
present position. Nominee directors would 
be in breach of duty if they disclosed 
information that would affect the company’s 
interests. In most circumstances, it would be 
expected that the nominee director would 
report back to their nominators, which is 
the primary purpose of putting nominee 
directors in their position. The nominee 
directors are given the task of controlling 
or supervising the company on behalf of 
its nominators. The duty of directors not 
to disclose company information or use 
confidential information without the consent 
of the company is incompatible with the 
nominee directors’ position (Thomas, 1997, 
pp. 149-150).
In comparison to other jurisdiction, 
New Zealand has taken a liberal approach 
concerning the duties of nominee directors. 
Section 145(2) (a) of the New Zealand 
Companies Act 1993 deals with the 
disclosure of information by nominee 
directors. It allows a director of company 
to disclose company information to his 
nominator, unless prohibited by the board of 
directors. In addition to this, a director of a 
company that is carrying out a joint venture 
between the shareholders may act in the best 
interests of the shareholders even though it 
may not be in the interests of the company 
if the constitution of the company allows 
him to act as such.
An important case on this matter is 
Berlei Hestia (NZ) Ltd v Fernyhough 
([1980] 2 NZLR 150). In this case an 
Australian Company had 40% shares in 
a New Zealand company and the articles 
of association of the latter allowed the 
Australian company to appoint directors in 
the New Zealand company. Later, there was 
a dispute between the two companies, which 
resulted in a breakdown in their relationship. 
Subsequently, the nominee directors were 
refused access to the company’s records and 
premises on the grounds that they were in a 
position to act in derogation of their duty to 
the company. In determining the nominee 
directors’ access to corporate information, 
Mahon J (at pp. 162-6) opined that to 
perform his duties as a director, it would be 
necessary for the director to be given access 
to corporate records and premises. His 
Justice further asserted that on the basis of 
the facts there was no evidence that showed 
that the Australian directors intended to act 
in breach of their fiduciary duty towards the 
company. The court in its decision relied 
on the decision of Jacobs J in Levin and Re 
Broadcasting Station that a nominee director 
should prefer the interests of the company 
rather than of their nominator; however, the 
nominee director may act for the interests of 
the nominator if there is no conflict.
Besides Levin and Re Broadcasting 
Station, Molomby v Whitehead ((1985) 63 
ALR) is also essential as in this case, it was 
held that the nominee director, Molomby, 
was entitled to information relating to the 
management and affairs of the company. In 
this case, Molomby had requested director 
access from the managing to documents 
relating to legal fees and various legal 
actions. The managing director refused 
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to supply all the documents requested, 
asserting that they were confidential. 
Beaumont J of the Federal Court highlighted 
that the case was different from Bennetts, 
which involved clear conflict of interest on 
the part of the director, and there was no 
such conflict in Molomby. This has been 
viewed as a pragmatic approach compared 
with Bennetts, which has been described as 
a strict view (Sievers, 1993).
Similarly, in an American case, Kortum 
v Webasto Sunroofs, Inc. (Del. Ch 2000), the 
court held that a director who represented 
50% of shareholders in a joint-venture 
corporation was entitled to inspect all books 
and records without any restrictions. It 
would be unreasonable to restrict Kortum’s 
inspection with an undertaking that he 
would not disclose the information to his 
nominator. The court agreed that in the 
absence of conflict Kortum may disclose 
the information to his nominator.
The Australian Corporation Act 2001 
makes no provision discussing specifically 
about nominee director; however, Section 
187 has implied concerns related to the 
issue. According to the section, a director 
of a wholly-owned subsidiary may act in 
the best interests of the holding company if:
• The constitution of the subsidiary 
expressly authorises the directors to 
act in the best interests of the holding 
company;
• The director acts in good faith in the best 
interests of the holding company; and
• The subsidiary is not insolvent at 
the time the director acts and does 
not become insolvent because of the 
director’s act.
The above provision allows a nominee 
of a holding to act in the best interests of 
the holding while acting as a director in a 
subsidiary by fulfilling certain requirements. 
This can be construed to include disclosing 
the company’s information to the holding 
company. 
In the United Kingdom, Section 173(2) 
of the Companies Act 2006 elucidates that 
directors would not be in breach if they 
acted in accordance with an agreement duly 
entered into by the company that restricts 
future exercise of discretion by its directors 
or if they acted in a way authorised by 
the company’s constitution. Based on this 
section, directors’ duties could be qualified 
by an agreement or by the company’s 
constitution. In Cobden Investment Ltd 
([2008] EWHC 2810 (Ch)), the court held 
that interests of the company could be 
qualified if there were unanimous consent 
of the shareholders but not to abrogate 
the duties owed to the company. This 
section, to a certain extent, will minimise 
the challenges faced by nominee directors 
in protecting the company’s confidential 
information. This means that nominee 
directors may disclose certain information 
to their nominators provided that it will not 
undermine the company’s interests. The 
position of nominee director in relation to 
company information has been elaborated 
in Richmond Pharmacology Ltd v Chester 
Overseas Ltd ([2014] EWHC 2692). In this 
case Chester held 44 % shares in Richmond. 
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As agreed in the shareholders’ agreement, 
Chester appointed two nominee directors 
to the Company’s board. The agreement 
provided that all commercially sensitive 
information should be treated as strictly 
confidential. However, the agreement 
provided that any party to the agreement 
may disclose the confidential information 
to its professional advisers and bankers and 
should procure that those persons should 
treat the information as confidential as 
well. Chester decided to sell its shares in 
Richmond, and for that purpose Chester 
appointed a financial advisor to whom 
it disclosed confidential information. 
The financial advisor then disclosed the 
information to the prospective buyer of 
Chester’s shares. Richmond brought action 
against Chester for breach of shareholders’ 
agreement and breach of directors’ duties 
against the two nominee directors as stated 
under Section 172 (duty to promote the 
success of the company), Section 174 
(duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and 
diligence) and Section 175 (duty to avoid 
conflict of interests).
The defendants in this case argued 
that the information could be treated as 
confidential even if it were communicated 
to a third party, provided care was taken to 
ensure that the third party was trustworthy 
and undertook to keep the information 
confidential. On that point, the court held 
that the ordinary and natural meaning 
of an obligation to treat information as 
confidential is that it may not be disclosed 
to anyone else.
The court emphasised that the nominee 
directors owed to Richmond the duties 
set out in sections 172, 174 and 175 of 
the Companies Act 2006. The nominee 
directors in performing this duty could take 
the interests of Chester (their nominator) 
into account, provided that their decisions 
were in what they genuinely considered to 
be the best interests of Richmond (citing 
Hawkes v Cuddy [2009] EWCA Civ 291). 
As for Section 175, which demonstrates 
duty to avoid conflict of interest that relates 
to exploitation of any property, information 
or opportunity, this duty is not infringed if 
the matter has been authorised by the board 
of directors. The court further explained 
that the test of whether there is a breach 
of Section 175 is an objective one and it is 
immaterial that the nominee directors acted 
in good faith or in the mistaken belief that 
they are entitled to do so. In other words, it 
does not depend on whether the director is 
aware that what he is doing is a breach of 
his duty.
On the other hand, there is a provision in 
the Singapore Companies Act (revised 2006) 
allowing nominee directors to disclose to 
their nominators information they have 
obtained as director of the company. Section 
158 of the Act states that a nominee director 
may disclose information to his nominator 
provided:
• The director declares at a meeting of the 
directors of the company the name and 
office or position held by the person to 
whom the information is to be disclosed 
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and the particulars of such information 
(Section 158[3][a]);
• The director receives prior authorisation 
by the board of directors to make the 
disclosure (Section 158[3][b]);
• The disclosure will not be likely to 
prejudice the company (Section 158[3]
[c])
The existence of this section is approved 
as it may ease the challenges faced by 
the nominee directors especially when 
their nominators enquire about certain 
information. However, it would not be easy 
for the board of directors to authorise the 
disclosure and it is also not easy to ascertain 
whether the information would prejudice the 
company or not (Kala & Foo, 2004). 
As for the Malaysian Companies Act 
1965, Section 132(1E) merely explains 
the general duty of a nominee director. 
In relation to confidential information it 
could be implied that nominee directors 
may disclose the information so long as 
it will not conflict with the interests of 
the company. To determine whether it is 
conflicting or not it would be necessary for 
the nominee directors to obtain approval 
from the board of directors. The provision 
has not been elaborated on and this requires 
the court to further interpret the provision. 
In the new Malaysian Companies Act 2016, 
to be enforced in stages by 31st January 
2017, there are no changes regarding the 
responsibilities of nominee directors. The 
provision in Section 132E is now in Section 
217(1) of the Companies Act 2016.
CONCLUSION
It is indeed obvious that the fiduciary duty to 
act for a company’s best interest and to avoid 
conflict of interest is very much related 
with the duty to protect the confidentiality 
of company information. Similarly, the 
vulnerable position of nominee directors, 
who are subject to dual loyalty, would be 
a great challenge for them as they seek to 
discharge their duty. Case laws and earlier 
writings have suggested that in facing the 
challenge, the task of the nominee director 
would be feasible by the existence of express 
contractual consent. Such a confidentiality 
agreement would be the threshold for 
nominee directors in disclosing company 
information and would also prevent misuse 
of company information (Moscow, 2011). 
In the absence of express consent, the 
existence of implied consent could be 
assumed. Implied consent would be based 
on accepted business practices and whether 
the information were confidential or not. 
The legislation and decided cases 
highlight that the directors, whatever 
name they are called, are subject to the 
same fiduciary duties. However, certain 
legislation and case laws allow the nominee 
directors some flexibility by allowing them 
to consider the interests of their nominator, 
which may include sharing certain company 
information with their nominators. However, 
this is only possible if there is no conflict 
with the best interests of the company. This 
shows that in whatever circumstances, the 
interests of the company are paramount 
and the flexibility given should not be 
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considered discrimination of duties among 
the directors.
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